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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVBATS-C

SUBJECT: After Action Report

→ CRD, 1st AVIATION BRIGADE, ATT: AVBAGO, APO SF 96309
CDR, FIRST REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND, ATTN: G-3 Advisor, APO SF 96349
CDR, UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT ELEMENT MRI, ATTN: OPNS, APO SF 96349

(U) 1. PURPOSE: To report chronologically and clarify significant organizational activities experienced by the 11th Combat Aviation Group during pre-standdown, standdown, withdrawal, and roll-up operations.

(C) 2. GENERAL: Inclusive periods are designated as follows: Pre-standdown phase 1 Nov 1972 through 28 Jan 1973; Standdown phase 29 Jan 1973 through 27 Feb 1973 (X+1 through X+30); Withdrawal phase 28 Feb 1973 through 14 Mar 1973 (X+31 through X+45); and Roll-up phase 15 Mar 1973 through 29 Mar 1973 (X+46 through X+60). These increments are criteria for the Group as a whole, taking into consideration that specific units within the Group completed a combined Standdown and Withdrawal phase between X+1 and X+15.

A. SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

(C) (1) PRE-STANDDOWN PHASE

Personnel activities within the Group, at unit and staff level remained normal in all respects until initial guidance for cease fire and standdown was received on 26 Jan 1973 that date specific instructions were received during command held at 1st Aviation Brigade Headquarters concerning the implementation of OPLAN 215. With a specific cease fire deal at hand the S-1 section immediately began to accelerate personnel actions as specified within the OPLAN. Personnel shipment rosters were prepared for each increment and individuals to be shipped on the initial increment were transferred to Camp Horn. Much of the administrative portions of the transfer and retrograde of equipment was accomplished in early November under the guidance of Project Enhance. This enabled the Group to merely hand receipt necessary property from the Vietnamese. The Group's mission remained the same with continued support throughout Military Region I to include combat and combat service support to the First Regional Assistance Command, I Corps, three Vietnamese Infantry Divisions, One Vietnamese Airborne Division, and One Vietnamese Marine Division.

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Classified by: S-3, 11th CAG
Subject to general declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Automatically downgraded at two year intervals
Declassified on 31 December 1976

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(C) Operational activities stabilized during the period as the Group continued to provide combat and combat service support to elements of FMAO and the Vietnamese I Corps. Although no major operations were conducted during this period the level of activity remained high and the Group logged an average of over four thousand flying hours a month.

(C) Reconnaissance provided by the Air Cavalry Troops became a primary intelligence tool for the American advisory staff as well as for the Vietnamese Commanders due to the diminishing air activity in Vietnam. With the advent of increased activity in southern Military Region I combat support took on a role of increased importance. The support provided by the remaining CH-47C Chinooks became the life's blood of many firebases and the friendly forces occupying them. The loss, early in this period, of the remaining OH-58's and CH-54's increased the burden upon the remaining aircraft which posed problems due to the increased hour load on the aircraft and pilots. This load was lightened somewhat by consolidating missions whenever possible, utilizing one aircraft, in many cases, to support several locations during scheduled hours of the day. A daily inter-regional shuttle was established utilizing a CH-47 that stopped at all major unit locations within the region on a regularly scheduled basis. This allowed individuals to conduct business or transport correspondence from one location to another without monopolizing an aircraft solely for that purpose.

(U) The 11th CAG experienced recurring problems with contractor support on the DaNang AFB compound. Supervisory personnel employed by contractor firms did not have access into the compound due to the lack of valid passes. These passes were not requested in sufficient time from the VNAF Military Police detachment located on the airbase. The problem stemmed from a lack of coordination between the contractor firms and the local military police forces. In many cases lengthy work delays were experienced due to the lack of these personnel. This problem was partially alleviated by providing individuals from the Group to escort these personnel on and off the post. This, while solving the problem in part, did not provide a permanent solution. In future situations involving American units stationed on installations maintained by a host country care should be taken to insure timely coordination between contractor firms and host security forces.

(C) Early November placed new requirements on the Group; with cease fire, entailing the complete withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam close at hand, much planning and preparation had to be accomplished. Items destined for turn over to Vietnamese forces had to be inventoried and prepared for transfer. This was accomplished with relative ease due to detailed prior coordination. When the cease fire went into effect the Group implemented OPLAN 215 and began the transition from combat activities to those of equipment retrograde/turn over and personnel withdrawal with relative ease.

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outprocess and report to Camp Horn on a regular schedule until 2 March 1973 when all personnel shipment was stopped due to problems in the prisoner exchange. Shipment was resumed on 5 March 1973. Consolidation of the Group Assets vacated property that was promptly turned over to the appropriate receiving agency. Negotiations were conducted with LSI and NHA personnel to help clarify and expedite the turn over of property to these personnel when no longer needed by the Group. The property turn over was conducted on a staggered schedule to allow the Group Commander to have maximum control of the property until vacated by Group personnel. This alleviated many problems without delaying or hampering property turnover.

(C) B. COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) PRE-STANDDOWN PHASE

(U) A shortage of personnel in critical MOS's presented a distinct problem during the pre-standdown phase. These shortages caused an increased maintenance manhour requirement due to the lack of trained personnel. These increased hours dedicated to maintenance were necessary to provide adequate on-the-job training for selected personnel to improve the quality of maintenance at the crew level.

(U) This period was highlighted by the implementation of what proved to be an effective drug education and rehabilitation program. Individuals who had serious problems at the beginning of the reporting period went through an intensive counseling and rehabilitation program which resulted in a decisive decrease in the usage of drugs by personnel previously identified as drug users.

(C) During this period an increased reliance on organic security became necessary due to the inadequacy of the security provided by regional forces personnel utilized by VNAF to provide this service. A security force was formed from the members of the Air Cavalry Troops' "Blues" platoon (the ground component of the Aero Rifle Platoon). These infantrymen had been utilized to recover downed aircrews and aircraft. The number of thefts decreased appreciably, and maintenance personnel were freed to concentrate on their primary jobs.

(U) Intelligence procurement and dissemination increased both in quality and quantity during the reporting period. The S-2 section was able to acquire intelligence from a greater number of sources and agencies than had been utilized before, enabling the section to cross check their information and evaluate the source, giving the units more exacting intelligence information. The end result was that pilots and mission commanders received thorough briefings on the tactical situation before they departed for the mission areas.

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(C) (2) STANDDOWN PHASE

On 28 January 1973 the 11th CAG ceased all combat operations and began to retrograde personnel and equipment. The turn over of PCS property began immediately at the Group's forward location on Tan My Island, reaching completion on X+8. Troops and equipment located at the forward location were moved to DaNang to facilitate a rapid turnover of property to the Vietnamese. Deep Water Pier was secured and opened as the retrograde site for CONUS EVAC aircraft and units began the movement of aircraft to the retrograde site. The preparation of all AH-1G and OH-6A aircraft for retrograde was completed on X+15. The first CH-47's were transferred to the retrograde site and prepared for shipment. Personnel were shipped to Camp Horn three days prior to their departure date to outprocess which aided the units in clearing their morning reports prior to the individual's actual departure from Vietnam. Inactivation of the Air Cavalry troops was completed on schedule despite problems incurred in the shipment of personnel due to reduced shipping allocations. Personnel were slotted for the special detachments, aircraft were issued and the detachments began daily missions on X+6. The 62nd CAC continued to provide daily support to the RAC at the levels which had existed prior to the cease fire, experiencing its first cutback in missions on X+28. The Group also maintained a standby gunship commitment consisting of 5 aircraft until X+16. The overall level of mission support continued through the standdown phase and into the withdrawal phase at a level of nine aircraft daily.

(C) (3) WITHDRAWAL PHASE

The Group entered the withdrawal phase with 402 personnel, a strength level, and 33 aircraft. As the RAC personnel were withdrawn from their forward locations and their numbers diminished the mission load decreased proportionally. By X+32 the daily mission load had dropped to 6 aircraft. The Group was tasked to maintain an additional contingent to support Operation Homecoming which required a freeze on shipment of selected personnel who had previously been scheduled for shipping during this increment. This commitment also made it necessary to retain 2 CH-47's to fulfill a standby recovery capability. This presented still another problem due to the arrival date of the ship to transport the retrograde aircraft to CONUS. These problems were alleviated by a revised shipping schedule for personnel who would be needed to support Operation Homecoming commitments and revised shipping and transfer dates for the aircraft involved. The CH-47's were released for turn-in on X+34 and were prepared for shipment by X+37. The ship arrived on its revised reporting date and no problems were experienced in loading the aircraft on board. Minor revisions had to be made in the shipment of personnel and aircraft so that the commitments contained in the Operation Homecoming plan could be met. Personnel continued to

(2) STANDDOWN PHASE

(C) Shipment of personnel became a problem due to the flexibility that the Group had to maintain during the early standdown phase. Additional commitments that were not outlined in the original plan had to be put into effect. An increased CH-47 commitment and the need to retain a standby gunship commitment during the early portion of the standdown phase made it necessary to retain personnel otherwise not required. Personnel that could have filled these slots were required to continue the Group's mission at existing levels. This necessitated shipment of personnel that were needed to complete the standdown at unit level. This was particularly significant in the case of F Troop 4th Cavalry which had a maintenance detachment at DaNang, while the bulk of the troop was at Tam My. These difficulties were short lived as the turn-in of property progressed and individuals were freed for shipment.

(C) Intelligence procurement became extremely difficult during this period. Sources that were available prior to the cease fire began their draw down making up-to-date information difficult to obtain. Without this valuable information aircrews were exposed to situations that could otherwise have been averted. Several aircraft sustained damage, after the cease fire, in areas that were still contested, though not reported as such.

(U) Daily missions continued within the parameters established within the OPLAN and began to diminish proportionally with the withdrawal of advisory personnel.

(U) Few problems were experienced in the turnover of property. Extensive planning and coordination conducted prior to the cease fire allowed smooth turnover to Vietnamese forces. The Group continued to consolidate its personnel and equipment, freeing buildings and station property for turnover as soon as possible. This eliminated the problems of theft and enabled the security platoon to reduce its personnel strength and ship excess personnel.

(3) WITHDRAWAL PHASE

(u) The shipment of personnel became a routine process characterized by minor revisions necessitated by Operation Homecoming. As commitments decreased personnel were, in turn, released for shipment. The CH-47's were released on X+34, packaged, and shipped on X+37. Loading and shipment of retrograde aircraft was a professional operation allowing the ship to depart early the following day.

(U) Transfer of assets and station property continued and final coordination with respective civilian contractors was completed, with tentative date for final turnover being X+55. The contractor personnel were receptive to our needs and were in agreement with the revisions necessary due to the Group's continued operation until X+59. The turnover of mess facilities and clubs was designed to provide uninterrupted operation during the change.

(U) The Group is, in the last few days of the withdrawal phase, continuing to tie up loose ends so that the final close out can be accomplished with a minimum of personnel and effort. All aircraft are readied for final transfer upon termination of missions and property is ready, when vacated, for occupancy by contractor personnel. This should facilitate an effortless withdrawal of personnel and final roll up of the 11th Combat Aviation Group's mission in the Republic of Vietnam.

(O) 3. SPECIFIC: Inclusive periods are designated as follows: Pre-standdown phase 1 November 1972 through 28 January 1973; Standdown phase 29 January 1973 through 27 February 1973 (X+1 through X+30); Withdrawal phase 28 February 1973 through 14 March 1973 (X+31 through X+45); and Roll-up phase 15 March 1973 through 29 March 1973 (X+46 through X+60). These increments are criteria for the Group as a whole, taking into consideration that specific units within the Group completed a combined Standdown and Withdrawal phase between X+1 and X+15.

A. SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

(1) PRE-STANDDOWN PHASE

(U) a. Personnel:

26 January 1973:

1. After a period when personnel activities remained normal in all respects the Group Adjutant and selected members of the staff received detailed guidance for implementation of OPLAN 215 at 1st Aviation Brigade headquarters. Personnel movement plans were drawn up and forwarded for approval.

(C) b. Equipment retrograde, turnover:

11 November 1972:

1. The last of the eleven (11) OH-58A helicopters assigned to the 62d Aviation Company (Corps) were flown to Nha Trang for turn-in.

13 November 1972:

1. The last of the five (5) CH-54A helicopters assigned to the 62d Aviation Company (Corps) were flown to Deep Water Pier, DaNang for turn-in.

14 November 1972 through 23 November 1972:

1. In conjunction with Project Enhance much of the equipment belonging to the 11th C.A.G. was title transferred to the ARVN and VNAF. This equipment was then hand receipted back to the using units.

25 November 1972:

1. The Group received a USARV Message that directed that all excess equipment should be turned in through normal supply channels before the end of the calendar year.

(U) c. Intelligence/Security:

5 November 1972:

1. Detailed briefings were established on a daily basis with elements of VNAF, USAF, D/17th Cavalry, 62nd Aviation Company (CORPS), and the S-2 Section 11th C.A.G. to improve the operational effectiveness of the Nighthawk base defense mission.

16 November 1972:

1. The S-2 Section assumed overall responsibility for the supervision of compound security, gate guards, and local national daily hires.

12 December 1972:

1. The Assistant S-2 became the OIC of the 11th C.A.G. TOC during the hours of darkness to increase the effectiveness of intelligence exploitation by the aircraft involved in the Nighthawk mission.

(C) d. Operations:

1 November 1972:

1. At BT007653 D Troop 17th Cavalry Nighthawk team observed 3 enemy personnel with weapons and packs. The team engaged resulting in 3 enemy KBH and one secondary explosion.

2. Air Cavalry elements from D Troop 17th Cavalry while conducting a visual reconnaissance four miles west of Firebase Baldy (BT049387) observed and engaged an enemy command bunker resulting in 3 enemy KBH.

5 November 1972:

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1. An AH-1G from D Troop 17th Cavalry was shot down during target engagement resulting in one U.S. KIA. An OH-6A aircraft attempting to rescue the downed aircrew received intense enemy small arms fire causing light damage to the aircraft and wounding the pilot. The pilot was able to maneuver the aircraft to a secure area.

2. A light reconnaissance team conducting operations 5 miles north of Dien Ban were engaged by an enemy command detonated mine resulting in one OH-6 A destroyed and 2 U.S. KIA.

6 November 1972:

1. A UH-1H from the 62nd CAC was flying a Naval gun-fire adjustment mission in Quang Ngai province. The pilot attempted to circumnavigate a storm line to return to home station. The attempt was unsuccessful and due to a low fuel situation the pilot was forced to execute a precautionary landing in the vicinity of BS346610 to wait for weather conditions to improve. Due to enemy activity in the area, the crew and passengers moved away from the aircraft to set up a defensive position. During the night the storm intensified causing heavy flooding of the river area and washing the aircraft downstream. Radio contact was maintained with the crew during the night and pickup was accomplished the following morning by a USAF HH-53. The aircraft was not recovered.

10 November 1972:

1. D Troop 17th Cavalry while conducting operations three miles east of Dai Loc, (AT978571), engaged and destroyed a bunker 15' by 20' resulting in 3 enemy KBH and one bunker destroyed.

2. F Troop 4th Cavalry engaged an enemy company sized element (AT812998) equipped with .51 caliber weapons resulting in 3 enemy KBH.

13 November 1972:

1. The last five CH-54A's assigned to the 62nd Aviation Company were flown to Deep Water Pier, DaNang RVN for turn in.

15 November 1972:

1. D Troop 17th Cavalry's Nighthawk team located and engaged an enemy launch site destroying 6 122mm rockets.

2. F Troop 4th Cavalry observed and engaged 2 T54 tanks, 2 Soviet Armored personnel carriers and 4 trucks one mile south of Qua Viet River (YD379662). During the engagement the team received heavy automatic weapons

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fire and one SA-7 was launched by enemy ground troops forcing the aircraft to depart prior to making a damage assessment of enemy forces.

19 November 1972:

1. DaNang AFB received an attack by fire (27 122mm rockets). The 11th CAG sustained damage to 2 aircraft and no personnel injuries.

26 November 1972:

1. A CH-47C from the 62nd Aviation Company received moderate small arms and automatic weapons fire while resupplying San Juan Hill. The aircraft sustained 1 hit from a .51 caliber weapon which passed through the copilot's windshield and several wiring bundles in the right forward cabin area causing an electrical failure. The aircraft commander was slightly wounded in the face and a precautionary landing was executed at Duc Pho. The aircraft was later repaired and returned to DaNang.

5 December 1972:

1. Elements from D Troop 17th Cavalry conducting a reconnaissance mission west of Duc Pho (BS302359) observed an enemy command bunker containing 10 personnel. The team engaged destroying the bunker and 10 KBH.

6 December 1972:

1. Elements from D Troop 17th Cavalry received small arms fire while conducting a reconnaissance South of Dai Loc (AT965560). The ensuing engagement resulted in 10 enemy KBH.

11 December 1972:

1. A light reconnaissance team from F Troop 4th Cavalry, acting as a Naval Gunfire adjustment platform, directed fires resulting in 11 secondary explosions.

12 December 1972:

1. An Air Cavalry white team from F Troop 4th Cavalry observed an enemy troop concentration and 2 130mm guns firing on friendly positions. The team adjusted Naval gunfire resulting in 12 secondary explosions.

19 December 1972:

1. Elements from F Troop 4th Cavalry conducted a search and rescue operation in the vicinity of YD400644 for the crew of a downed Air Force OV-10. The team was

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successful in extracting the downed pilots and returning them to DaNang for medical attention. The pilot of the OV-10 died of injuries incurred in ejection and the aerial observer was treated for injuries and returned to duty.

26 December 1972:

1. DaNang AFB received an attack by fire (19 122mm rockets) lightly damaging 2 CH-47C aircraft, negative casualties were sustained.

30 December 1972:

1. Elements from D Troop 17th Cavalry conducting operations in Quang Ngai province (BT028668) engaged an area occupied by 50 to 60 enemy personnel resulting in 10 enemy KBH.

31 December 1972:

1. A light reconnaissance team from F Troop 4th Cavalry observed 4 tanks and 20 troops at YD338704. The team adjusted Naval gunfire with unknown results.

3 January 1973:

1. Elements from D Troop 17th Cavalry conducting reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of BT118242 observed an enemy encampment area. The team engaged resulting in 10 KBH and one POW captured by the C&C aircraft.

4 January 1973:

1. A light reconnaissance team from D Troop 17th Cavalry observed an enemy encampment area at AT826638. The lead OH-6A received intense small arms fire damaging the aircraft and wounding the gunner. The aircraft was able to return to DaNang and seek medical aid for the wounded crewmember.

6 January 1973:

1. A light reconnaissance team conducting a bomb damage assessment of a B-52 strike (YD298748) observed trucks moving in the area. The team adjusted Naval gunfire resulting in 5 secondaries and 6 sustained fires.

8 January 1973:

1. DaNang AFB received a misdirected Loran strike causing light damage to one building and one UH-1H aircraft. Six members of the 11th CAG were slightly injured with minor cuts and bruises.

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2. A UH-1H aircraft from the 62nd Aviation Company while flying in support of the Vietnamese Airborne Division was reported shot down in enemy held territory northwest of Quang Tri (vic YD3155). Field reports indicated that the aircraft was hit by small arms fire and an SA-7 missile. Negative contact was established with the crew and repeated attempts to locate the aircraft were unsuccessful. USAF aircraft participating in Search and Rescue efforts reported intense anti-aircraft fire and numerous SA-7 firings throughout the area. The search and rescue attempt was terminated with negative results and four crewmembers and two passengers are listed as missing in action.

9 January 1973:

1. Elements from D Troop 17th Cavalry located and damaged a 130mm field gun. Air Force fighter bombers on station reported destroying the gun and 180 rounds of ammunition.

10 January 1973:

1. A light observation team from D Troop 17th Cavalry located a cache of 20 122mm rockets (AT955627). The team vectored Vietnamese ground forces into the area and the rockets were captured intact.

13 January 1973:

1. An OH-6A from D Troop 17th Cavalry received heavy small arms fire in the vicinity of BT003609, the aircraft received damage and the Vietnamese advisor on board was wounded.

16 January 1973:

1. A UH-1H from the 62nd Aviation Company (CORPS) conducting standardization training, sustained damage from an unknown explosive device which detonated as the aircraft terminated a pinnacle approach to Marble Mountain (BT068711). The instructor pilot made a precautionary landing in a rice paddy near the base of the pinnacle. A maintenance recovery team was dispatched to the site and the aircraft was flown to DaNang.

17 January 1973:

1. The Nighthawk team from D Troop 17th Cavalry discovered an enemy 122mm rocket launch site, engaged and destroyed 6 rockets. Enemy troops were able to launch 22 rockets which impacted on DaNang AFB resulting in negative damage or injury within the 11th CAG.

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22 January 1973:

1. Elements from D Troop 17th Cavalry observed and engaged an enemy squad size element in a small village vicinity BS753382. The team destroyed three hootches and one bunker, killing four personnel and capturing one enemy soldier.

28 January 1973:

1. Elements from F Troop 4th Cavalry engaged targets along the Son Tra River resulting in 30 enemy KEE. The contact terminated at 0755.

2. At 0800 hours all armed combat activities by the 11th Combat Aviation Group ceased due to the provisions of the unilateral ceasefire in the Republic of Vietnam.

- (U) e. Logistics: Not Applicable
- (U) f. Transfer of control of air combatant assets: Not Applicable
- (U) g. Transfer of functions and reporting: Not Applicable
- (C) h. Transfer of billeting, bases, installed property and equipment, and other real property.

26 January 1973:

1. All PCS and installation property was title transferred to ARVN and VNAF.

STANDDOWN PHASE: 28 JANUARY 1973 -- 27 FEBRUARY 1973

(U) a. Personnel:

28 January 1973:

1. Shipment of personnel was begun on X Day and proceeded according to instructions received in conjunction with the implementation of OPLAN 215.

15 February 1973:

1. The Morning Reports of F Troop 4th Cavalry and D Troop 17 Cavalry were zeroed out. All of the personnel from these units had been either shipped out of country, transferred to the Joint Military Commission or the ICCS, or assigned to the Headquarters 11th CAG.

(C) b. Equipment retrograde/transfer

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28 January 1973:

1. D/17 Cavalry ceased Combat operations and prepared to retrograde all OH-6A helicopters to CONUS through the 142nd Transportation Company.
2. D/17 was informed of a requirement to maintain five AH-1G Cobra Gunships on strip alert for an indefinite period. Two of the gunships would be provided by F/4th Cavalry with crews provided by D/17. All other AH-1G Cobras were prepared for retrograde.
3. F/4th Cavalry ceased Combat operations and prepared to retrograde all AH-1G Cobra Gunships and all OH-6A helicopters to CONUS through the 142nd Transportation Company.
4. 142nd Transportation Company issued final S.O.P.s to all units for the turn in and retrograde of all aviation equipment.
5. 62nd Aviation Company (CORPS) continued their normal mission load and assumed responsibility for providing maintainance support for the UH-1H helicopters to be utilized by the ICCS and the JMC.

1 February 1973:

1. 62nd Aviation Company (CORPS) turned in one (1) UH-1H aircraft to 1st Air Division, VNAF.
2. F/4 Cavalry completed the turn in of all OH-6A and AH-1G aircraft (with the exception of the two (2) AH-1G Cobras which remained on strip alert).
3. D/17 completed the turn in of six (6) AH-1G and seven (7) OH-6A helicopters and the PLL of UH-1H parts plus all parts for the OH-6A and AH-1G.
4. The 11th C.A.G. Aviation Maintenance Officer instructed 62nd Aviation Company (CORPS) that all command consoles would remain on board and be turned in with the aircraft.

3 February 1973:

1. The remaining UH-1H aircraft belonging to D/17 Cavalry Troop, F/4th Cavalry Troop, and the 142nd Transportation Company were laterally transferred to the 62nd Aviation Company (CORPS). This represented a total of ten (10) UH-1H aircraft.
2. The 11th CAG had a total of thirty three (33) UH-1H aircraft on hand. All of these were assigned to the 62nd

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Aviation Company (CORPS) and were to be utilized in the following manner: nineteen (19) for 62nd operations, eight (8) under operational control of the Four Power Joint Military Commission, and 6 (6) under the operational control of the International Commission for Control and Supervision.

3. One (1) CH-47C was turned over to the 142nd Transportation Company for preparation for retrograde to CONUS.

5 February 1973:

1. One (1) CH-47C was turned into the 142nd Transportation Company for preparation for retrograde to CONUS.

10 February 1973:

1. F/4th Cavalry Troop completed turn in of all equipment and after auditing, destroyed their property books.

15 February 1973:

1. 519th Medical detachment completed turn in of all accountable property. 277th S&S Battalion audited their property books, confirmed all zero balances, and destroyed the books.

2. D/17 Completed turn in of all accountable property and, after auditing, destroyed their property books.

20 February 1973:

1. Because of a gradual reduction in the mission requirement for UH-1H aircraft, two (2) UH-1H were turned in to VNAF.

2. Two (2) CH-47C aircraft were turned in to the 142nd Transportation Company for retrograde.

22 February 1973:

1. The 62nd Aviation Company (CORPS) completed the turn in of all PLL stock to the 142nd Transportation Company.

23 February 1973:

1. The last increment of the Group's basic load of ammunition was turned in to the ARVN ASP #511 in DaNang.

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26 February 1973:

1. One additional UH-1H was turned in to the 1st Air Division VNAF.

27 February 1973:

1. One additional UH-1H was turned in to the 1st Air Division VNAF.

RECAP: During the standdown phase the Group closed the property books of the 519 Medical Detachment, the 321st Airfield Detachment (Divisional), D Troop 17th Cavalry, and F Troop 4th Cavalry. We turned 12 UH-1H aircraft over to the 1st Air Division VNAF, turned in 4 CH-47C helicopters, 18 OH-6A and 17 AH-1G helicopters to the 142nd Transportation Company for retrograde to CONUS. During this period Group aircraft strength went from 84 to 33.

(U) c. Intelligence/Security

28 January 1973:

1. The S-2 section conducted a survey of all units in the 11th CAG to determine the volume of classified material which would require shipment with the unit records and submitted requests for sufficient records shipment containers to ship all required material.

2. Plans were implemented to arrange for a security platoon to handle security for the 11th CAG compound and the CONUS Evac point at Deep Water Pier.

2 February 1973:

1. S-2 arranged for additional liason with FRAC G- to provide rapid update to the current enemy situation. This was necessary to compensate for a lack of information about current tactical situations. ARVN sources were very reluctant about forwarding information which was required for pilot briefing.

3 February 1973:

1. S-2, having overall responsibility for physical security, implemented plans to release as many local national employees, both house maids and daily laborers, as rapidly as possible contingent upon the pace of troop withdrawals.

27 February 1973:

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1. The S-2, acting on instructions received from the Military Region One "Assistance in Kind" custodian, terminated the employment of daily hires, instructed the compound gate guards that no daily hire personnel were to be allowed on the compound, and submitted all AIK financial data records for audit.

(C) d. Operations:

28 January 1973:

1. UH-1H aircraft, number 68-15352, received fragmentation damage from incoming rockets while on Orange Pad at Quang Ngai (vic BS649737). The aircraft sustained seven (7) hits with negative casualties. Upon inspection, it was determined that only light damage had been sustained and the aircraft was flown back to DaNang for replacement.

2. UH-1H aircraft, number 67-17843, while flying in support of GORDS received moderate small arms fire (vic BS742525). There were negative hits or casualties and the aircraft continued on its mission.

29 January 1973:

1. The U-21A section was relieved from attachment to the 62nd Aviation Company (CORPS).

30 January 1973:

1. UH-1H aircraft, number 70-15795, flying in support of the 3rd ARVN Division received light small arms fire (vic BT055515). Negative hits or casualties were taken and the mission was completed.

2. UH-1H aircraft, number 68-16122, while flying for the Quang Ngai Province Senior Advisor received intense small arms fire (vic BS557900). After landing at Binh Son (vic BS601921) and inspecting the aircraft and crew it was found that the PSA, COL Truman R. Bowman had been lightly wounded in both arms. The aircraft sustained fifteen (15) hits and was determined not airworthy. COL Bowman returned to Quang Ngai city by vehicle and a CH-47C aircraft was dispatched from DaNang to recover the UH-1H.

1 February 1973:

1. UH-1H aircraft, number 67-17843, received three (3) rockets while on the ground at Duc Pho (vic BS812318). Negative damage was inflicted to the aircraft or crew and the mission was completed.

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2 February 1973:

1. UH-1H aircraft, number 68-15352, while flying for CORDS, received intense small arms fire (vic AT935837). Negative damage or casualties were sustained and the aircraft completed its mission.

3 February 1973:

1. UH-1H aircraft, number 69-15947, while flying for the 1st ARVN Division received light small arms fire (vic AT935837). The aircraft sustained one (1) hit in the left drive shaft access panel on the tail boom section. There were negative casualties and the mission was completed.

4 February 1973:

1. Due to a change of command within FRAC, the requirements for a DCG aircraft was eliminated.

2. CH-47C aircraft, number 67-18495, while on a mission for the 2nd ARVN Division to LZ Stinson received light small arms fire (vic BS555815). The aircraft sustained one (1) hit through the forward green blade. There were negative casualties and the mission was completed.

5 February 1973:

1. UH-1H aircraft took over the FRAC shuttle-bus requirements from CH-47C aircraft.

8 February 1973:

1. UH-1H aircraft, number 70-15671, while supporting FRAC received light small arms fire (vic BS735523). There were negative hits or casualties and the aircraft completed the mission.

10 February 1973:

1. UH-1H aircraft, number 69-15674, while supporting the 2nd ARVN Division received light small arms fire (vic BS790400). The aircraft sustained one (1) hit in the leading edge of the main rotor blade with negative casualties. The mission was flown to completion.

12 February 1973:

1. Two (2) CH-47C aircraft, numbers 67-18505 and 67-18495, were dispatched to Phu Bai airfield (YD886154) to transport, under the direction of JMC representatives, NVA and Viet Cong POW's to some predetermined location to the north. The pilots were briefed at Phu Bai and stood by until the mission was cancelled at 1900.

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13 February 1973:

1. All excess navigational maps were turned over to LTC Kahn, USAF-AFAT, for transfer to VNAF.

14 February 1973:

1. Two (2) CH-47C aircraft, numbers 67-18505 and 67-18495, transported one hundred (100) NVA and Viet Cong POW's from Phu Bai airfield (YD886154) to Camp Evans (YD541348). The POW's were then trucked from Camp Evans to the exchange point.

16 February 1973:

1. 62nd operations received a warning order for "OPERATION HOMECOMING". The mission called for ten (10) UH-1H aircraft and one (1) CH-47C aircraft. Steps were taken to comply with the requirements of the warning order.

17 February 1973:

1. The 62nd Aviation Company (CORPS) was relieved from the requirements of furnishing aircraft support for the Marine Division Senior Advisor, 1st ARVN Division Senior Advisor, and the 3rd ARVN Division Senior Advisor.

20 February 1973:

1. The 62nd Aviation Company (CORPS) was relieved from the commitment of providing a UH-1H aircraft for the FRAC shuttle-bus run.

25 February 1973:

1. The 62nd Aviation Company (CORPS) was relieved from the commitment of providing two (2) UH-1H aircraft in support of CORDS.

- e. Logistics: Not Applicable
- f. Transfer of control of air combatant assets: Not Applicable
- g. Transfer of billeting, bases, installed property and equipment, and other real property.

1 February 1973:

1. F Troop 4th Cavalry completed the transfer of the installation at Tan My Island. The Island, with all installed property and equipment, was turned over to the 1st ARVN Division.

(3) Withdrawal Phase: (X+31 through X+45 -- 28 February through 14 March 1973)

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(C) a. Personnel:

2 March 1973:

1. In accordance with a message received from USARV, all shipment of personnel was halted until further notice.

5 March 1973:

1. Due to favorable action on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Provisional Revolutionary Government in their commitment to release U.S. prisoners of war, shipment of personnel was resumed.

2. Shipment rosters were prepared to provide personnel movement schedules which would satisfy two alternate plans as they would affect Group strength requirements. One plan reflected a requirement that the Group maintain sufficient assets to support the Operation Homecoming effort until X+59; the other plan would relieve us of this commitment on X+45. All movements of personnel during the withdrawal phase are linked to an as yet unknown decision which will determine the necessary strength for the period from X+46 through X+59.

3. Plans were made to transfer all personnel remaining in the Group after X+45 to the morning report of the 62nd Aviation Company (CORPS) on X+45, 14 March.

(C) b. Equipment retrograde/turnover

11 March 1973:

1. The Camp Swampy area was released to the VNAF at 1700 after all personnel, military and civilian, under the control of the 142nd Transportation Company had moved to the Camp Gimlet compound.

12 March 1973:

1. Current plans call for the property on hand in the Camp Gimlet compound to be picked up on the hand receipt of U.S. contractor personnel who will remain in the compound.

(U) c. Intelligence/Security

1. During the withdrawal phase each unit consolidated its personnel into fewer and fewer quarters to allow the buildings to be inventoried and sealed. This allowed the units to discharge many of their housemaids and cut down on the number of local nationals with access to the compound.

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2. As each unit shipped its personnel and equipment the S-2 section conducted counter-intelligence inspections to insure that all classified material and official material had been destroyed or turned over to proper authorities.

3. The Custodian of classified material in each unit was required to account for the disposition of all classified material before he was allowed to outprocess.

12 March 1973:

1. All Secret documents remaining in the Secret register are scheduled to be released for shipment.

(C) d. Operations:

1. An AC-119 Stinger Gunship with six Vietnamese and Five U.S. Air Force crewmembers executed successive missed approaches at DaNang due to bad weather. Low fuel forced the crew to abandon ship over the South China Sea in conditions of heavy fog. The 11th CAG Group Commander, in a UH-1H operated as the Air Mission Commander for the rescue effort; directing a CH-47C from the 62nd Aviation Company (COKPS) and personally rescuing two VNAF crewmembers. The end result was 5 USAF personnel and 5 VNAF personnel rescued. One Vietnamese crewman drowned.

3 March 1973:

1. The 11th CAG was relieved from all CH-47C commitments and the aircraft were prepared for turn-in.

(U) e. Logistics: Not Applicable

(U) f. Transfer of control of air combatant assets: Not Applicable

(U) g. Transfer of functions and reporting: Not Applicable

(C) h. Transfer of billeting, bases, installed property, and equipment and other real property.

1. During the withdrawal phase plans were implemented to turn Gimlet compound on DaNang air base over to U.S. contractor personnel. These contractors would hand receipts the buildings, installation property, and PCS equipment directly from the VNAF.

B. COMMANDER'S COMMENTS ON LESSONS LEARNED

(1) PRE-STANDDOWN PHASE

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(C) a. OBSERVATION: The follow-up urinalysis program IAW USAFV Reg 600-10 became ineffective for several reasons. Due to a lack of transportation the results of samples forwarded to Saigon from our unit were not available for 10 to 12 days. The 95th Evacuation Hospital terminated their follow-up urinalysis program and provisions were not made for the establishment of a back-up program.

EVALUATION: In an environment where a great deal of priority is placed on a test such as the drug testing program provisions must be made to support such a program. Our unit needed to receive the results in a more timely manner so that actions could be initiated for those who were confirmed abusers.

RECOMMENDATION: Transportation must be made available to subordinate units for the purpose of providing priority shipment for urine samples between widely dispersed points. It is very difficult for subordinate units to make these types of arrangements and it puts them in the position of begging space on flights. It further results in an uneconomical use of manpower in an area that isn't even authorized one person on a Group TO&E. Higher headquarters also should have published a specific letter of instruction to outline procedures to be followed at the time the 95th Evac Hospital ceased to function as a follow-up urinalysis center.

COMMAND ACTION: Our drug personnel took the initiative to meet courier and passenger flights at the airfield to insure that samples were shipped. We also made arrangements for the 11th C.A.G. dispensary to collect samples to forward to the appropriate medical facility in Saigon. The 11th C.A. Drug Abuse Officer also notified his counterpart at G-1 First Aviation Brigade, to make him aware of the problems.

(U) b. OBSERVATION: Recommendations for awards required an average of four to six weeks at Headquarters, First Aviation Brigade for boarding action before they were returned to the unit. There were also many instances where awards were lost in the administrative process after they left this headquarters. Due to the inherent time lag the fact that an award had been lost did not manifest itself until five or six weeks after submission.

EVALUATION: Our unit needed a more expeditious method of receiving approval of awards. Initially when an award was taking an inordinate amount of time we needed to evaluate where the bottleneck was. We had very limited means of monitoring the date that awards were received by this headquarters, which didn't give us any information about the length of time each recommendation took to clear our

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headquarters. After checking these things we were able to determine that in almost every instance the award was lost after it left us for Brigade.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that higher headquarters expedite the processing of awards and place firmer controls on an award once it arrives at their location. At a minimum they should log the date of arrival and the date departed and keep a location listed for the whereabouts of each award at all times.

COM AND ACTION: We instituted stringent controls on our recommendations and began a card file system which monitored the award from the time that it was received until it had been approved or disapproved by our higher headquarters. This at least enabled us to fix the blame for losing the award. We also insured that we kept a complete file copy of each award that we processed so that we could make true copies of the recommendations that were lost at brigade. We also notified the Brigade AG as these problems surfaced.

(U) c. OBSERVATION: There was a considerable amount of personnel turbulence and personnel shortage in all areas. This period was characterized by minimum personnel staffing and continually operating at lower skill levels than would be considered prudent under optimum conditions.

EVALUATION: We were continually plagued by the curtailment of US Forces in RVN. Curtailments came into effect periodically slashing our manning level with very little consideration being given to critical skill areas. A considerable percentage of our aviators were required to fly more than the recommended number of hours with approval of the flight surgeon because there was a shortage of aviators in the Group. Very few new enlisted personnel arrived with any experience even though they were school trained. This required that massive GST programs be established to maintain an effective and safe aviation maintenance program. Trying to man an Aviation Group in a combat zone, without the proper number of experienced personnel is a venture into an area of possible catastrophe. The safety of crew and passengers for every flight should be foremost in the minds of everyone at every level of command. When requesting personnel with this in mind the replacements are no longer numbers but become meaningful players in the key mission of providing safe effective flight hours for supported units.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that higher headquarters emphasize the criticality of having highly motivated, well

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trained individuals in aviation units. Also each higher headquarters must make a diligent effort to evaluate the quality of replacements. There is a tendency to manage Army personnel quantitatively rather than qualitatively. This often results in an imbalance of experience from unit to unit. We should also give more consideration to the fact that in a combat zone or any high hour flying program it will be necessary to operate aviation units in shifts if the mission is to be performed adequately. There are also the numerous house-keeping and security functions that must be performed and since no augmentation is provided for this these people must come from within an already overtasked unit. Keeping these considerations in mind we should move toward a higher manning level or we should take house-keeping and security functions away from units and relegate them to lower skilled individuals assigned for this purpose. We should also increase the number of personnel sufficiently to insure at least two full eight to ten hour shifts.

COMMAND ACTION: We tried to place personnel in the best position to benefit the Group. As new personnel arrived we interviewed each man individually to ascertain his experience level and any special skills he might have. Then, based on each unit's needs, we tried to spread out our experience equitably so that everyone would benefit. We also kept our higher headquarters advised of our status so that they could assist us in maintaining adequate levels of skilled personnel.

- (C) d. OBSERVATION: Defense of an installation against indirect fire weapons is a mission which requires maximum flexibility and the highest degree of cooperation between all available installation defense elements.

EVALUATION: In an effort to increase the effectiveness of Nighthawk base defense operations the 11th CAG, during the previous reporting period, had arranged for the S-2 section to have access to special intelligence information from the DaNang SSO office, and established a daily briefing for Nighthawk crews, AC119 stinger gunship crews, USAF intelligence officers, VNAF Nighthawk crews, and operations elements. With the continual decrease in the aviation assets available for this critical mission, efforts were directed toward increased flexibility and quick response to enemy activities. Due to the increase in intelligence resources available, and the perishable nature of much of the information gathered about enemy activities in the DaNang rocket belt, new methods of directing the Nighthawk operation for maximum effectiveness and shock had to be devised. Nighthawk helicopter crews tended to concentrate

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their efforts in areas of historical V.C. and NVA activity and thus allowed the enemy to gain an advantage by shifting his areas of operation. With the limited assets which could be dedicated to the Nighthawk operation it was impossible to cover the 380 square kilometers which make up the area from which rockets, and similar indirect fire weapons, may be employed against DaNang air base.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) That the assistant S-2 take over supervision of the 11th CAG tactical operations center during the hours of darkness so that intelligence information from SSO, the USAF intelligence staff, the 3rd ARVN Division and other sources could be effectively evaluated and passed immediately to the Nighthawk crews in flight to increase our flexibility and quick response capabilities.

(b) That sweep patterns in the DaNang area be limited to the area three kilometers on either side of the line, circling the base, that represents the maximum effective range of the 122mm rocket; unless intelligence indicates that there will be activity in some other part of the area on any particular night.

(c) That maximum use be made of AC-119 stinger gunships and VNAF UH-1 assets to provide more continuous coverage during the hours of darkness.

(d) That, during the periods of high threat, the Nighthawk team be relieved on station by the first light team provided by D/17th Cavalry.

(e) That a limited program be established to include military personnel from other elements of the intelligence and base defense teams in the crews of the Nighthawk missions to provide an increased awareness of the value of accurate information and the need for close cooperation between all base defense elements.

COMMAND ACTION: All recommendations listed above have been instituted by the 11th CAG.

(U) o. OBSERVATION: The most common problem that has manifested itself in the Forward Supply Point during the period has been the inability to establish good rapid communications between the Forward Supply Point and the Central DSSA in Saigon.

EVALUATION: Due to the lack of the automatic DATA processing capability, the Forward Supply Point had to do everything in the manual mode. This would have not been a major problem had it not been for the fact that with the loss of air support (no U-21's from the 1st Avn Bde and no US Air Force SMAR flights), both sending and receiving NOCS requests and paper work required as much as 7 days.

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RECOMMENDATION: Either ADP systems much be maintained or the SHAR (aircraft) capability retained in the future, if rapid replacement of parts and disposition of major shipments is to be accomplished smoothly.

COMMAND ACTION: In an attempt to shorten the time span, a system of calling the DSSA twice a day was set up. Also the FRAC U-21 was used as frequently as possible.

- (U) f. OBSERVATIONS AND EVALUATIONS: Due to the lack of military personnel, a daily physical inventory of tools and equipment was not practical. Although the military has maintained the primary hand receipt through the unit PBO, the "hands-on" maintenance and control of the property has been by the civilian contractor. Although no major losses have occurred under this system, it is not an adequate method of maintaining physical control over the equipment. Since the civilians have the need for the equipment, they should also have the direct responsibility of inventorying and maintaining it.

RECOMMENDATIONS: When a civilian contractor totally accepts all "hands-on" maintenance with the military maintaining a supervisory, quality assurance role, the contractor should also be allowed to accept the needed equipment as a hand receipt holder. It is recommended that the site supervisor sign for the equipment and then delegate his responsibility by sub-hand receipting the individual shop sets, tool cribs, and tool boxes to the "lead men" of the respective sections.

- (U) g. OBSERVATIONS: Life Support Equipment maintenance is not provided by any unit in the Army.

EVALUATION: While the Project Manager for Life Support Equipment has provided a number of fine and adequate items of survival equipment, there is no one assigned or trained to repair the equipment. Floatation equipment is a typical example. Upon inspecting all of the Survival Kit, Individual Overwater (FSN 8465-973-1863 LIN U7286) that had been carried on this unit's aircraft, it was discovered that each CO2 inflation bottle was still packed in a cardboard box and not fitted to the life raft. This is the way that the kit is issued through supply channels. No one knew how, or was technically qualified to inspect and maintain this item. Another example is that more than 50% of the Life Preservers, Underarm (FSN 4220-630-8714) units checked did not function or had cuts and holes worn in the inflation wings. By the standards of the other services, some of these units were overdue time change retirement from the service. A careful check of AR 611-201 will show that repair of Life Support Equipment is not a part of the job description or training of any MOS in the United States Army. TM 55-8465-206-13, Maintenance of Army Survival kits, has been published.

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This TH-55 series manual would indicate that those functions should be performed within Transportation Corps Aircraft Maintenance Units. Current TO&Es do not provide personnel.

RECOMMENDATION:

- (a) That appropriate modifications be made to AR 611-201 (possibly to MOS 43E, Parachute Rigger) to establish the responsibility for LSE repair.
- (b) The LSE repairmen be trained for this work (possibly by other service schools).
- (c) That TO&Es be written to provide necessary personnel and equipment.

COMMAND ACTION: Recommendations have been forwarded to higher headquarters.

- (U) h. OBSERVATION: There are civilian institutions in Military Region One where U.S. Army personnel from the 11th C.A.G. could provide voluntary assistance to needy Vietnamese people.

EVALUATION: There are numerous areas in close proximity to the 11th C.A.G. where medical, economic and social assistance to the Vietnamese people is inadequate.

RECOMMENDATION: That the officers and men of the 11th C.A.G. take advantage of every opportunity to meet and work with the Vietnamese--building good will and understanding between the people of the United States and Vietnam.

COMMAND ACTION:

- (a) On numerous occasions, elements of the 11th C.A.G. have provided both the Crescent Beach and the Sacred Heart orphanages with excess/unserviceable equipment such as plywood, nails, blankets, beds and pillows.
- (b) Gifts of food and building materials were furnished to the directors of the leper colony at Crescent beach after a sapper attack had destroyed five of their wards.
- (c) The "Shoe-shine Boys"; an organization to assist homeless street boys, was supported by gifts of beds, mattresses, plywood, light fixtures, paint and other building materials. Personnel from the 11th C.A.G. spent their free time assisting in the construction of a home in DaNang city for these orphans of the street.

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(d) Each flight surgeon assigned to the C.A.G. conducted a vigorous campaign of Med-Cap efforts, not only among the Vietnamese employees of the 11th C.A.G. but also among the local orphanages and hospitals.

(e) At Tan My island, the location of F Troop Fourth Cavalry, medical treatment was given to the families of local villagers. The Cav Troop also conducted air/sea rescue efforts to drag local fishermen from the water when their boats would capsize in the frequent heavy seas, and contributed supplies, money and assistance for local schools and orphanages.

(f) Numerous functions were sponsored by the officers and men of the Group to promote better understanding and good will between the Vietnamese people and U.S. forces; Christmas and Thanksgiving parties for the children and families of the local Vietnamese employees and informal social functions for the commanders and staffs of local Vietnamese Army and Air Force units.

(g) The chaplain for the 11th C.A.G. actively publicized the plight of the orphans in DaNang and, with the commander's encouragement, arranged for those members of this command who wished to do so, to adopt Vietnamese Children.

(2) STANDDOWN PHASE

(U) a. OBSERVATION: No major problems were experienced by this unit during the standdown phase. Four (4) days advance notice of the standdown allowed this unit to expedite all personnel actions and suspense correspondence. This advance notice also enabled the personnel to ship their hold baggage in advance and was further facilitated by the relaxing of the regulation requiring individuals to have PCS orders before shipping their baggage. A minor problem arose with the requirement for all personnel to wear khakis on the flight to CONUS. Brass and belts with brass buckles were not in the supply system, nor were they available at the post Exchange. This required enlisted personnel to pay, out of their own pockets, for items that should have been government issue, at concessions operated by local nationals. This unit was informed of this requirement only two days in advance of the first shipment of personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the uniform requirements be given in advance to the units to allow for uniform accessories to be made readily available to all personnel through normal supply channels.

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- (U) b. OBSERVATION: No provisions for centralized control of physical security have been made, and physical security rapidly became critical after the ceasefire.

EVALUATION: The requirement for maintaining adequate physical security falls naturally into two areas. The first is the requirement to protect classified information and to deny the enemy information about current and projected operations. The second is the requirement to safeguard government supplies and equipment and the personal belongings of military personnel.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) That in addition to normal S-2 activities for providing supervision of the security of all classified material and encouraging unit programs to educate military personnel about the need for security of personal belongings and requirements for safeguarding classified defense information; the S-2 section expand its activities in the physical security field.

(b) That the S-2 section assume overall supervision of the operations of the security forces, direct the deployment of guards, and establish operating procedures for the gates controlling access to 11th CAG areas.

(c) That the assistant S-2 assume custody of the "Assistance in Kind" daily laborer fund and insure that adequate supervision is provided for local nationals working on the compounds belonging to the 11th CAG.

COMMAND ACTION: All recommendations listed above have been instituted in the 11th CAG.

- (C) c. OBSERVATION AND EVALUATION: The transfer of Shop Platoon equipment to VNAF contained several inherent problems. Although the USAHV OPLAN was followed as to inventorying and preparing equipment for transfer by the 142nd Trans Co (ADS), the VNAF gave little cooperation towards an efficient turn in. A schedule was established as to time and place of turn in, but the VNAF failed to show with their representatives at the prearranged time. This disregard for scheduling resulted in a loss of manpower and equipment hours needed for other phases of the standdown mission, i.e. flat bed trailers and 5 ton tractors.

RECOMMENDATION: The primary inventory phase of shop platoon equipment should have been done jointly by US Military and VNAF representatives; thus relieving the time factor of reinventory just prior to transfer. It is recommended that VNAF appoint more personnel for handling

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and accepting of transfer items. To our knowledge, only VNAF officer was able to sign for this equipment and he was never present at prearranged times.

- (C) d. OBSERVATION: The 11th CAG was responsible for the retrograde of 25 AH-1G, 17 OH-6A, and 7 CH-47C helicopters from Vietnam via the Deep Water Pier at DaNang.

EVALUATION: This unit had the responsibility for preparing all AH-1G, OH-6A, and CH-47C helicopters in MR-1 for retrograde via ship from the Deep Water Pier in DaNang. Some of the factors to be considered were how much of the preparation would be handled by the owning unit prior to turn-in to this unit and how to transport the aircraft from their location at DaNang Air Force Base to the Deep Water Pier. Additionally, it was necessary to coordinate very closely with the higher headquarters during the operation.

COMMAND ACTION:

(a) The aircraft were prepared by having the units thoroughly clean the aircraft prior to turn-in. This unit then completed the preparation of the aircraft for shipment, i.e. preserving engines, removing rotor blades, sealing the aircraft, etc. The only significant problem encountered was a requirement from higher headquarters for information from the aircraft log books after the aircraft had been prepared. This necessitated opening the aircraft to get to the log books and then resealing the aircraft. Another problem was that the units did not remove the explosive cartridges from the AH-1G rocket pod mounts in all cases. This required re-opening the barrier paper covering the AH-1G stub wings on a few aircraft and then resealing the:

(b) The OH-6A aircraft were transported to the Deep Water Pier in the Sea Land vans that they were to be shipped in and presented no specific problems other than securing the helicopters in the vans. Two helicopters were placed in each van by placing them at a slight angle so that their tail booms were alongside each other. The helicopters were held in place by means of 2x4 bracing nailed to the floor of the van alongside and over the helicopter skid tubes. The wooden boxes containing the OH-6A main rotor blades were secured by padding them with cushioning material and strapping them to the floor of the van underneath the helicopter using salvage cargo tiedown straps. The straps were nailed to the floor of the van at each end. Shipping the OH-6A helicopter in Sea Land vans facilitated ease of transportation and loading and unloading at the ports of embarkation and debarkation as well as increasing the protection from corrosion during shipment.

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(c) The AH-1G helicopters were prepared for shipment at DaNang Air Force Base and transported to the Deep Water Pier on flat bed trailers when the preparation was complete. Sufficient low-boy trailers were not available, necessitating the use of regular flat bed trailers. It was necessary to lift some overhead wires along the way to allow the helicopters to pass underneath. Even so, a few low hanging wires were ripped down during the movement. Use of low-boy trailers would have prevented this. The AH-1G main rotor blades were shipped in standard AH-1G main rotor blade shipping boxes and presented no unusual problems. One helicopter was damaged when the truck upon which it was loaded pulled forward while the crane that was used to lift the helicopter onto the trailer was still attached to the helicopter "lifting eye". As the truck pulled forward, the helicopter slid aft along the trailer until the rear of the helicopter skids lodged in the wheel well cutouts on the trailer, causing the helicopter to rock backwards breaking the "stinger" and damaging the tail boom when it struck the rear edge of the trailer bed. The helicopter transmission mounts and skid attaching points may possibly have been damaged as well.

(d) The CH-47 helicopters were flown to the Deep Water Pier and final preparations were performed on each aircraft at that location, except for one unflyable one that was transported to Deep Water Pier by surface means. Final preparation of the aircraft at the Deep Water Pier required the dispatch of men and equipment to that point, but presented no particular problems. The CH-47 rotor blade boxes were used to ship most of the rotor blades. Those blades, for which boxes could not be found, were secured in racks inside the helicopters. The CH-47 retrograde operation went smoothly with no unusual problems.

COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (a) That the requirement for information from aircraft logbooks be determined prior to sealing the aircraft for final preparation.
- (b) The preparing unit should ensure that all explosives are removed prior to sealing the aircraft.
- (c) That the Sea/Land van method of shipment be used for shipping OH-6A helicopters in the future.
- (d) That AH-1G helicopters be transported on low-boy trailers instead of regular flat-bed trailers.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVBATS-C

SUBJECT: Annex "A" To After Action Report

CRD, 1st AVIATION BRIGADE, ATT: AVBAGO, APO SF 96309
CDR, FIRST REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND, ATTN: G-3 Advisor, APO SF 96349
CDR, UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT ELEMENT MRI, ATTN: OPNS, APO SF 96349

- (U) 1. PURPOSE: To summarize significant activities occurring during the roll up operations conducted by the 11th Combat Aviation Group.
- (U) 2. GENERAL:
- A. ROLL-UP PHASE: X+46 through X+60.

The roll up phase is scheduled to begin with the redeployment of the 11th Combat Aviation Group Colors on 16 March 1973. HHC morning report has drawn down to two entries, Cpt Frank Leggio and CSM Richard Kegriss who will carry the colors, the morning report, unit history file and other memorabilia to Headquarters, USAEUR.

On 11 March 1973, the 321st Signal Detachment, and the 519th Medical Detachment zeroed their morning reports. The 142d Transportation Company will zero out its morning report on 15 March 1973. The Group Commander, remaining personnel of the Group Staff and needed personnel from the deactivated units have been transferred to the 62d Combat Aviation Company. Although greatly consolidated, command and staff relationship remain essentially the same through an ever decreasing work load. The daily missions have stabilized at five UH-1H aircraft in support of the First Regional Assistance Command. The Operation Homecoming commitment remains at 11 aircraft with crews plus nominal administrative and logistic support.

The 62d CAC has 16 UH-1H aircraft remaining, all of which have been transferred to VMAF and handrecepted back to the company. This phase was scheduled to begin with 120 personnel, however, due to the shipping freeze announced on 11 March 1973, 257 personnel remain assigned. In accordance with instructions from the Army Support Element, MR 1, all personnel have initiated individual out-processing.

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B. COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS:

With the exception of the frequent changes in projected shipping schedules, the roll-up phase has been free of significant problems. VMAF and the various civilian contractors have been cooperative and the turn over of real property and property book items has nearly been completed. The remaining items can be transferred in a few hours.

The Security Platoon has done a satisfactory job in keeping the theft of Government and personal equipment at an acceptable level. ASE Headquarters at Camp Horn has experienced considerable problems and has task the Group for twenty men in order to form a security detachment.

Once personnel are released for shipment, no problems are anticipated in drawing down to the projected level of 76 officers and men remaining on X+60. Effective on X+55, the 62d CAC is scheduled to zero out it's morning report with the remaining personnel being assigned TDY to FRAC at no cost to the government.

With the scheduled release of all missions and commitments on X+59, a long, proud history of Army Aviation in Military Region I of the Republic of Vietnam will come to an end.

(U) 3. A. SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES:

None available at completion of report.

B. COMMANDERS COMMENTS ON LESSONS LEARNED:

None available at completion of report.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVBATS-C

SUBJECT: Annex "B" To After Action Report

CRD, 1st AVIATION BRIGADE, ATT: AVBAGO, APO SF 96309
CDR, FIRST REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND, ATTN: G-3 Advisor, APO SF 96349
CDR, UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT ELEMENT MRI, ATTN: OPNS, APO SF 96349

- (U) 1. PURPOSE: To report significant activities and lessons learned by the 4 power special aviation detachment.
- (U) 2. GENERAL: This report will cover the activities of the JMC Aviation Detachment from its activation on 28 January 1973 until completion of activities and deactivation of the detachment.

A. SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

The FPJMC Aviation support package was formed on 272400H January 1973, and consisted of 8 UH-1H aircraft, 1 OIC, 16 pilots, 8 Crew chiefs, 1 NCOIC, and 1 Technical Inspector. A 23 man NHA civilian work force was authorized, but never identified by name or separated from the 142nd Transportation Company manpower pool for economy of force reasons. On X+7 the detachment was further augmented by the addition of a trained maintenance officer. As JMC Teams were designated for Region I and Region II, separate aviation detachments had to be established to augment each team. The two aircraft in support of JMC Region I remained, out of the necessity for support, under the control of the larger Region II team.

During the period 28 January to 13 March 1973 the Region I and II Aviation Detachments flew 525 hours, carried 140 passengers, and transported 10 tons of cargo. On two occasions 7 out of the total 8 aircraft were tasked for daily missions, however, the average daily commitment was 5 aircraft per day.

The maintenance teams that supported the detachment, though hampered by the scarcity of selected parts, were able to complete 5 periodic examinations, and several major component changes. Despite the fact that no blade hour restrictions were placed on the missions and no ceilings were placed on the number of aircraft

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that could be committed on a daily basis, the detachment was able to maintain an availability rate of 81%. This was due largely to the outstanding maintenance support provided by the 142nd TC shop teams.

B. COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Few major problems were experienced by the detachment during the operational period. The major problems experienced by the JMC as a whole were not associated with the aviation aspects but in the coordination between the 4 powers themselves. All missions assigned to the aviation detachment received a timely response and experienced only minor difficulties during the conduct of the mission. The detachment recorded one firing incident during the period which resulted in negative damage to the aircraft or injuries to the crew or passengers. This is significant because numerous hours were flown into contentested areas or territory owned by the PFG/DRV. Unfortunately the FPJMC never fully deployed into Region I or Region II, consequently most of the flying hours were in support of routine administration missions and the aircraft were never fully utilized for their stated purpose.

(U) 3. A. SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

27 January 1973:

1. At 2400hrs the FPJMC special flight detachment was formed and prepared for missions to commence on notification of the cease fire.

28 January 1973:

1. The first mission in support of FPJMC was flown to transport initial personnel to the Region I headquarters in Hue.

5 February 1973:

1. The aviation detachment transported DRV contingents from DaNang Air Base to the FPJMC compound located at Camp Horn.

7 February 1973:

1. The aviation detachment was augmented by the addition of a maintenance officer to aid the team in required daily and scheduled maintenance.

2. The aviation detachment transported DRV contingents from DaNang Air Base to the FPJMC compound located at Camp Horn.

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11 February 1973:

1. The aircraft detachment inserted two PRG representatives into Tra My (old Hau Duc) without incident.

12 February 1973:

1. Aircraft from the 3MG detachment transported PRG representatives from Tra My to the FPJMC compound located in DaNang.

28 March 1973:

1. The FPJMC is scheduled to be disbanded on this date with all aircraft turned over to the VNAF and all personnel transferred to shipping points for transfer to CONUS.

B. COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS ON LESSONS LEARNED

None

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349

AVBATS-C

SUBJECT: Annex "C" To After Action Report

CRD, 1st AVIATION BRIGADE, ATT: AVBAGO, APO SF 96309
CDR, FIRST REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND, ATTN: G-3 Advisor, APO SF 96349
CDR, UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT ELEMENT MRI, ATTN: OPNS, APO SF 96349

(U) 1. PURPOSE: To summarize the activation, operation, and standdown of the ICCS Flight Detachment in MR I.

(U) 2. GENERAL:

A. SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

- (1) ORGANIZATION PHASE: (28 January 1973) Upon notification of the cease-fire on 28 January 1973 the ICCS Flight Detachment was formed from the personnel and equipment assets of the 11th CAG. Major Zeno K. Rector (XO 11th CAG) was designated as the detachment commander.
- (2) OPERATIONAL PHASE: (29 January to 20 March 1973) The ICCS flight detachment conducted transportation and resupply for the ICCS delegations in Region I and II (MR I).
- (3) STANDDOWN - WITHDRAWAL - ROLL UP PHASE: (20 March to 21 March 1973) The ICCS flight detachment was relieved of flying responsibilities by Air America on 21 March. Assigned personnel were withdrawn from RVN and equipment was turned over to PA & E and Air America.

B. COMMAND OBSERVATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (1) ORGANIZATIONAL PHASE: (28 January 1973)
- (2) OPERATION PHASE: (29 January to 20 March 1973)

OBSERVATION: ICCS personnel were not aware of the aviation detachment available to them in MR I.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That ICCS personnel be briefed on the aviation assets available to them.

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OBSERVATION: Poor communication existed between operation personnel in region I and region II causing a mis-utilization of aircraft by the ICCS Teams.

RECOMMENDATION: Aviation support be routed thru one operations office where missions can be properly scheduled to prevent waste of aircraft blade time.

OBSERVATION: Aircraft were being used to fly to areas where adequate and secure ground transportation was available.

RECOMMENDATION: That ICCS personnel should first attempt to move personnel and supplies by road convoy unless time is of the essence.

OBSERVATION: ICCS personnel made no apparent attempt to observe ground activities between their regional and field locations when they traveled by aircraft.

RECOMMENDATION: ICCS personnel should use road convoys as the primary means of transporting supplies and personnel. This would present more opportunities to observe the actions of the PRG, DRV, NVAF and US personnel from a vantage point.

(3) STANDDOWN - WITHDRAWAL - ROLL UP PHASE: (20 March to 21 March 1973)

OBSERVATION: Air America continues to postpone the acceptance of the ICCS mission in MR-I. The initial transfer of missions was to take place on X+30. It has since been postponed to X+37, X+44, and is presently scheduled for X+51. This has caused unnecessary hardship on assigned personnel and their families who need a definite date to prepare for the move to their next assignment.

RECOMMENDATION: That Air America be required to reassign aircraft and pilots from their missions in other areas to support the ICCS mission in Vietnam.

(U) 3. SPECIFICS

A. SECTION 1 -- SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

28 January 1973 ICCS detachment formed with 13 officers, 8 EM, and 6 UH-1H's all from 11th CAG assets. Maintenance support would be provided by 62nd Avn Co. Personnel to be assigned to 62nd Avn Co.

31 January 1973 ICCS quartermaster party from Saigon arrived to inspect DaNang and Hue facilities. Parties were briefed on the aviation assets available to them.

5 February 1973 ICCS teams arrived from Saigon and deployed to DaNang and Hue.

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5 February 1973 coordination meeting held with operation officers from DaNang, Hue Regional Headquarters, and the Aviation Detachment.

6 February 1973 First mission flown in support of ICCS.

14 February 1973 to 22 February 1973 ICCS flown to Quang Tri to observe daily prisoner exchange.

28 February 1973 ICCS aircraft received ground fire Northwest of Hoi An, coord BT085625 wounding the pilot. ICCS members from Canada and Indonesia were aboard.

29 February 1973 All ICCS aircraft were grounded until further notice on orders from Saigon ICCS Headquarters. Exceptions will require written approval.

9 March 1973 ICCS team taken to Gio Linh field site. 1st time to cross North of Thach Han River.

20 March 1973 Aircraft transferred to Air America.

20 to 21 March 1973 Personnel departed RVN.

B. SECTION 2 - COMMANDER'S COMMENTS

EVALUATION: During the operations phase it became apparent that the delegation from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland know very little about the utilization of helicopters in supporting their mission.

OBSERVATION: The "Chip" personnel were using aircraft for short flights between secure areas where less expensive ground transportation was available. Aircraft were also being flown with only a few personnel on board.

RECOMMENDATION: Chip personnel should be briefed on the expense and effective use of blade hours when employing aircraft.

COMMAND ACTION: The detachment commander and operations officer conducted extensive discussions about aircraft utilization with operation personnel in both ICCS Region I and II.

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11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
FROM 1 NOVEMBER 1973 THROUGH 28 JANUARY 1973

11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
APO, 96349

HHC, 11TH CAG
APO, 96349

62ND AVIATION COMPANY (CORPS)
APO, 96349

519TH MEDICAL DETACHMENT
APO, 96349

321ST AIRFIELD DETACHMENT (DIVISION)

F TROOP, 4TH AIR CAVALRY SQUADRON
APO, 96349

D TROOP, 17TH CAVALRY SQUADRON
APO, 96349


142ND TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
APO, 96349

(INCLOSURE 1)

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ORGANIZATION OF 11TH CAG
28 JANUARY 1973



(INCLOSURE 2)

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11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
CHANGE IN COMMAND & STAFF POSITIONS
1 NOVEMBER 1972 THROUGH STANDDOWN/INACTIVATION

| <u>UNIT OR STAFF POSITION</u> | <u>DATES</u> | <u>NAME</u> |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| GROUP COMMANDER | 14 JUN 72 - 28 MAR 73 | STANLEY D. CASS 523-44-2707, LTC, FA |
| EXECUTIVE OFFICER | 27 APR 72 - 28 MAR 73 | ZANE K. RECTOR 413-54-2705, MAJ, FA |
| S-1 | 20 OCT 72 - 28 MAR 73 | FRANK J. LEGGIO, JR. 144-38-2617, CPT, TC |
| S-2 | 1 APR 72 - 10 NOV 72 | RICHARD W. PEDERSON 141-40-3799, CPT, FA |
| | 10 NOV 72 - 28 MAR 73 | WELDON O. SPENCER 450-70-9673, CPT, MI |
| S-3 | 18 OCT 72 - 28 JAN 73 | JOHN P. KENNEDY 029-30-6274, MAJ AR |
| | 28 JAN 73 - 28 MAR 73 | WILBERT W. SORENSON 523-50-2603, MAJ, AR |
| S-4 | 1 SEP 72 - 28 MAR 73 | JOE E. P. NISH 254-54-2908, MAJ, IN |
| CO, 62ND AVIATION Co. (CORPS) | 6 OCT 72 - 13 MAR 73 | OLLIE C. CRADDOCK 261-54-6273, MAJ, FA |
| CO, F TROOP, 4TH CAV | 10 SEP 72 - 12 FEB 73 | KERMIT E. LARSON 463-62-9607, MAJ, AR |
| CO, D TROOP, 17TH CAV | 3 SEP 72 - 12 FEB 73 | WILBERT W. SORENSON 523-50-2603, MAJ AR |

(INCLOSURE 3)

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LITE COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
AWARDS AND DECORATION
1 NOVEMBER 1972 - 28 MARCH 1973

| | |
|----------------------------|-----|
| SILVER STAR | 0 |
| DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS | 5 |
| BRONZE STAR | 21 |
| AIR MEDAL | 116 |
| ARMY COMMENDATION MEDAL | 32 |
| TOTAL | 174 |

(INCLOSURE 4)

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11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH
AS OF 28 JANUARY 1973

| UNIT | OFFICERS | | WO | | ENLISTED | | TOTAL | |
|-------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | <u>AUTH</u> | <u>ASSD</u> | <u>AUTH</u> | <u>ASSD</u> | <u>AUTH</u> | <u>ASSD</u> | <u>AUTH</u> | <u>ASSD</u> |
| HHC, 11TH CAG | 16 | 16 | 0 | 2 | 24 | 32 | 93 | 50 |
| 62ND Avn Co | 25 | 30 | 60 | 24 | 298 | 175 | 383 | 229 |
| 142ND Trans Co | 6 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 151 | 62 | 163 | 71 |
| D Troop, 17TH Cav | 19 | 20 | 31 | 22 | 216 | 180 | 266 | 222 |
| F Troop, 4TH Cav | 19 | 18 | 31 | 19 | 216 | 152 | 266 | 189 |
| 321ST AD(D) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 8 | 15 | 9 |
| 519TH Med | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 9 |
| TOTALS | 87 | 90 | 128 | 70 | 920 | 617 | 1195 | 779 |

(INCLOSURE 5)

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11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
OPERATIONAL STATISTICS
1 November 1972 - 28 February 1973

| | | |
|-----------------------|----------|--------|
| HOURS FLOWN: | NOVEMBER | 4,682 |
| | DECEMBER | 4,196 |
| | JANUARY | 4,289 |
| | FEBRUARY | 1,406 |
| CUMULATIVE HOURS: | | 30,245 |
| SORTIES FLOWN: | | 45,741 |
| TROOPS LIFTED: | | 15,218 |
| CARGO LIFTED: (TONS) | | 2,518 |
| ENEMY KBH: | | 90 |
| STRUCTURES DAMAGED: | | 206 |
| STRUCTURES DESTROYED: | | 322 |
| SANPANS DAMAGED: | | 19 |
| SANPANS DESTROYED: | | 120 |
| VEHICLES DAMAGED: | | 0 |
| VEHICLES DESTROYED: | | 0 |
| TANKS DAMAGED: | | 0 |
| TANKS DESTROYED: | | 0 |

(INCLOSURE 6)

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LINE COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY
1 November 1973 - 28 March 1973

| MONTH | SHOT * AT | DAMAGED | SHOT DOWN |
|----------|-----------|---------|-----------|
| NOVEMBER | 51 | 15 | 3 |
| DECEMBER | 55 | 9 | 4 |
| JANUARY | 25 | 11 | 1 |
| FEBRUARY | 5 | 2 | 0 |
| MARCH | 2 | 1 | 0 |

(INCLOSURE 7)

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11TH COMBAT AVIATION GROUP
AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZED AND ON HAND
28 January 1973

62ND AVN CO

D TROOP, 17TH CAV

F TROOP, 4TH CAV

ARND TRANS CO

| UH-1H | | AH-1G | | OH-6A | | CH-47 | |
|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-----|
| AUTH | O/H | AUTH | O/H | AUTH | O/H | AUTH | O/H |
| 20 | 21 | | | | | 6 | 6 |
| 10 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 9 | 7 | | |
| 8 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 9 | | |
| 2 | 2 | | | | | | |

(INCLOSURE 8)

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